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to achieve it were to vest the power of choice in the plaintiff or to
confer power upon the courts to qualify his selection. '20  In the past,
courts have considered this particular venue statute as conferring a
special right because of its legislative history. Now Congress has mani-
fested an intent to confer power upon the courts to qualify the selection
of forum. Therefore, applying the test laid down by the Supreme
Court, it is submitted that this is no longer an absolute right. Without
this idea of an absolute right, the obstacle to using injunctions in the
federal courts no longer exists; interference by injunction should be
allowed if it is allowed by applying forum non conveniens. The rule
that a federal court may not enjoin the proceeding in a state court will,
of course, remain unchanged.2 T As for the state courts, the Miles case
pointed out that the right to sue in state courts under the Act is of the
same quality as such right in the federal courts. It would seem to
follow that if venue is subject to interference in the federal courts,
it may also be interfered with in the state courts. The state courts
would again say that nothing in the FELA prevents their applying
forum non conveniens or granting injunctions.
It is hoped that the courts will not hold the new provision of the
Judicial Code applicable only in cases arising under the general venue
provisions of the federal courts.27 If, instead, the courts do carry out
the apparent intent of Congress and apply the doctrine of forum nwn
conveniens in suits brought under the FELA, they would provide a
solution fair to both employee and railroad in that the injured employee
would still have a wide choice of forums but where this right was
abused the courts could protect the defendant by refusing to exercise
jurisdiction.
KATHERINE S. WRIGHT.
Criminal Procedure-Method of Raising Constitutional Issues-
Writ of Coram Nobis
The federal courts have become increasingly zealous of protecting
the rights of those whose convictions have been obtained without due
". United States v. National City Lines, 68 Sup. Ct. 1169, 1182 (1948).
2' Section 2283 of the revised Judicial Code incorporates some general excep-
tions which the old §265 did not have. One of these exceptions wyas put in to
overrule Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941), which de-
cision was followed by Southern Ry. v. Painter, 314 U. S. 155 (1941) (see note
5 supra). The exception will not apply in the Painter case, however, because in
that case there was no federal decree to protect as in the Toucey case. See South-
ern Ry. v. Painter, supra at 160 (concurring opinion) ; Reviser's Notes to §2283,
28 U. S. C. C. S. at page 1910.
-" Since the preparation of this note three federal district courts have decided
that §1404(a) of the revised Judicial Code applies to suits under the FELA.
Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 79 F. Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948); White v.
Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 411 (N. D. Ill. 1948); Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
P. R. R., 80 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
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process of law.1 Whereas, at one time, it was necessary for a petitioner
seeking relief from a state conviction by means of a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district courts to show that he had exhausted all his
available state remedies, 2 it now appears that a petitioner who has ex-
hausted but one of several available state remedies, may petition the
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. 3 Under this line of
decisions, however, in default of any state procedure by which the
question of due process can be raised, the federal courts will take juris-
diction.4 In state procedure such questions can of course be raised by
motion for a new trial made in apt time,5 but if this remedy has been
allowed to lapse without fault of the petitioner, he may find himself
denied due process. In North Carolina no statutory procedure has been
outlined and there is nothing more than a judicial intimation of the
procedure whereby he may raise these questions and have the merits
of his constitutional claim passed upon by the highest state court.
In a recent North Carolina case,6 petitioner had been indicted on
several capital charges involving first degree burglary. He tendered
pleas of guilty of second degree burglary which were accepted and he
was thereupon sentenced. The statutory period for appeal lapsed and
the term of superior court in which he had been convicted expired,
without an appeal having been perfected or a motion for a new trial
made. A year and a half later petitioner applied to a judge of the
superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that at his trial he
had been denied due process of law in that he had been unable to
employ counsel and had been denied benefit of counsel when he was
required to plead to the capital charges. Upon a hearing the application
was dismissed. Petitioner then applied to the supreme court for a
I Wade v. Mayo, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1947) ; Loftus v. Illinois, 68 Sup. Ct. 1212
(1947) ; Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 68 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1947) ; Foster v. Illinois,
332 U. S. 134 (1946); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1946); Hawk
v. Olsen, 326 U. S. 271 (1945) ; White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) ; House
v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1944);
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943); Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179
(1907) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 217 (1948).
2 White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944) ;
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943); Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
'Wade v. Mayo, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1947).
'Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 68 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1947); Foster v. Illinois,
332 U. S. 134 (1946); Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U. S. 271 (1945); see Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 115 (1935).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §§15-174, 1-207, 7-11 (1943) ; State v. Dunheen, 224 N. C.
738, 32 S. E. 2d 322 (1944); State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172 S. E. 399
(1933) ; State v. Lea, 203 N. C. 316, 166 S. E. 292 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S.
668 (1932) ; State v. Cox, 202 N. C. 378, 162 S. E. 907 (1932) ; State v. Casey,
201 N. C. 620, 161 S. E. 81 (1931) (motion may be made at trial term only if
no appeal; if appeal, motion can be made the next succeeding term following
affirmance of judgment on appeal).
'In re Taylor, 229 N. C. 297, 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948).
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writ of certiorari to review the judgment in the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding. Held: The writ of habeas corpus is not a proper remedy to
raise the constitutional question the petitioner seeks to present for review.
Certiorari was denied. The court, however, intimated that an appro-
priate procedure would have been to petition the supreme court for
permission to file in the superior court a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis.
The writ of error coram iwbis, or corarn vobis,7 is of ancient com-
mon law origin. The writ was devised to allow a court which rendered
a judgment to review it for an error of fact, existing at the time of the
judgment, but unknown to the court; which fact, if it had been known,
would have led to a different result.8 The writ did not lie for an error
of law,9 but was limited exclusively to errors of fact, and has been
used to set aside a previous judgment when plaintiff or defendant was a
married woman ;1o an infant had appeared by attorney instead of by next
friend or guardian ad litem; a party was insane at time of trial ;12 a
party died before judgment ;13 there was error in the service of process
or notice to the other party ;1_4 or clerical mistakes were made in enter-
ing the judgment. 5
Such a writ has been used as a part of North Carolina procedure1 0
and has been regulated by statute,17 but the use of the writ in civil cases
seems to have been replaced by statutory remedies, either by motion for
a new trial or other appropriate motions.' s
12 TIDD, PACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KINGS BENCH 1136 (3d Am. ed. 1840);
III BL. Comm. 1158 (4th ed., Cooley, 1899); see Massie v. Hainey, 165 N. C.
174, 177, 81 S. E. 135, 136 (1914) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 736, 68 S. E.
240, 242 (1910).
,See Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393, 394 (1861); cases collected in 49
C. J. S., JUDGMENTS §312(c).
'2 TIDD, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1136.
10 Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393 (1861) ; see Lassiter v. Harper, 32 N. C.
392, 394 (1849) ; 1 STEPHEN, PLEADING 119 (3d Am. ed. 1837) ; 2 TroD, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 1136.
" 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. spra note 10, at 119; 2 TIDD, op. Cit. supra note 7, at
1136; see cases collected, 49 C. J. S., JUDGMENTS, p. 566 n. 86.
"2See note, 121 A. L. R. 267 (1939).
"3See Tyler v. Morris, 20 N. C. 625 (1839) ; 1 TIDD, op. Cit. supra note 7, at
1136; cases collected, 49 C. J. S., JUDGMENTS, p. 567 n. 91.14See Massie v. Hainey, 165 N. C. 174, 178, 81 S. E. 135, 136 (1914) ; cases
collected, 49 C. 3. S., JTUDGMENTS, p. 566 n. 76.
" Haiwassee Lumber Co. v. United States, 64 F. 2d 417 (C. C. A. 4th 1933);
see Note, 126 A. L. R. 956 (1940).
10 Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393 (1861) ; Latham v. Hodges, 35 N. C. 267
(1852) ; Williams v. Edwards, 34 N. C. 118 (1851) ; Lassiter v. Harper, 32 N. C.
392 (1849); Tyler v. Morris, 20 N. C. 625 (1839); see Massie v. Hainey, 165
N. C. 174, 81 S. E. 135 (1914).
1' N. C. REV. STAT., c. 4, §20 (1836-37). But see Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C.
731, 68 S. E. 240 (1910).
1 Simms v. Sampson, 221 N. C. 379, 20 S. E. 2d 554 (1942); Welch v. Welch,
194 N. C. 633, 140 S. E. 436 (1927) (infant improperly represented) ; Cox v.
Cox, 221 N. C. 19, 18 S. E. 2d 713 (1942); Hood v. Holding, 205 N. C. 451, 171
S. E. 633 (1933) (party insane at time of trial) ; Taylor v. Caudle, 208 N. C.
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Under the civil procedure of North Carolina, a superior court re-
tains jurisdiction of a judgment for a limited time after the close of
the term,19 but may entertain a motion in the original cause to set aside
a judgment for irregularity at any time.2 0  Therefore, since statutory
remedies are available for the same relief which could be obtained at
common law only by writ of error corarn nobis, these remedies seem to
have superseded the writ in practice.
2 1
In criminal actions, unlike civil, a superior court does not retain
jurisdiction to set aside a judgment on motion after the term has ex-
pired22 unless there has been an appeal.2 After the term expires at
which judgment was rendered in a criminal proceeding, and no appeal
is taken, the jurisdiction of the superior court ends insofar as the terms
of the judgment are concerned. 24 Therefore, the superior court is with-
out jurisdiction to entertain any motion by defendant based on a denial
of a constitutional right at such trial.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina by the constitution 25 and
statutory provision pursuant thereto, 26 is given general supervisory
jurisdiction, and under this power it can grant any remedial writs neces-
sary to insure the proper administration of justice in the lower courts.
As has been pointed out, the writ of error coram nobis has been a part
of North Carolina procedure and will remain so unless specifically abro-
gated by statute.2 7  And while it seems no longer to be used in civil
298, 180 S. E. 699 (1935) ; Wood v. Watson, 107 N. C. 52, 12 S. E. 49 (1890) ;
Knott v. Taylor, 99 N. C. 511, 6 S. E. 788 (1888) ; Lynn v. Lowe, 88 N. C. 478
(1883) (death of a party before judgment); Monroe v. Niven, 221 N. C. 362,
20 S. E. 2d 311 (1942) ; Groce v. Groce, 214 N. C. 398, 199 S. E. 388 (1938) ;
Fowler v. Fowler, 190 N. C. 536, 130 S. E. 315 (1925) (error in service of
process) ; Everett v. Johnson, 219 N. C. 540, 14 S. E. 2d 520 (1941) ; Massie v.
Hainey, 165 N. C. 174, 81 S. E. 348 (1914) (inadequate notice to other party) ;
N. C. Joint Stock Bank v. Cherry, 227 N. C. 105, 40 S. E. 2d 799 (1946) ; Ragen
v. Ragen, 202 N. C. 753, 194 S. E. 458 (1937) (clerical mistakes in entering
judgment) ; see generally Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 736, 68 S. E. 240, 242
(1910); McINrosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTI cE AND PROcEDURE §656 (1929).
'9 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-220 (1943) (jurisdiction to set aside for mistake, sur-
prise, excusable neglect within one year) ; Federal Land Bank v. Davis, 215 N. C.
100, 1 S. E. 2d 350 (1939) ; Abernethy Finance Co. v. First Security Trust Co.,
213 N. C. 369, 196 S. E. 340 (1938) (judgment pending until satisfied, open to
motion for execution, recall of execution, determination of proper credits); Mc-
INTOSH, op. cit. supra note 18, §§649 et seq.
"o Federal Land Bank v. Davis, 215 N. C. 100, 1 S. E. 2d 350 (1939); Hood
v. Stewart, 209 N. C. 424, 184 S. E. 36 (1936) ; MCINToSH, op. cit. supra note 18,
§653.
21 See note 18 supra.
-2 State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172 S. E. 399 (1933) ; State v. Casey, 201
N. C. 620, 161 S. E. 81 "(1931) ; Lancaster v. Bland, 168 N. C. 377, 84 S. E. 529
(1915).
" State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172 S. E. 399 (1933); State v. Lea, 203
N. C. 316, 166 S. E. 292 (1932); State v. Cox, 202 N. C. 378, 162 S. E. 907
(1932) ; State v. Casey, 201 N. C. 620, 161 S. E. 81 (1931).
4 Cases cited note 5 supra. 2 N. C. CoNsT. Art. IV, §8.
2' N. C. GEN. STAT. §7-10 (1943).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943).
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actions, there is no reason why it should not be used in criminal actions
where there is no other adequate remedy.28 From the nature and pur-
pose of the writ it could not be used by the supreme court, because the
writ does not lie from a higher to a lower court,20 but the supreme
court under its supervisory powers could direct and empower the superior
court to assume jurisdiction of the prior cause and to hear the petition
for the writ. Such action on the part of the supreme court would be
discretionary. Even so, if the court in its discretion declined to exer-
cise its power to direct the superior court to hear the petition for the
writ on the grounds that the application did not show substantial merit,
the applicant would have had his constitutional claim passed upon by
the highest state court.80 On the other hand, if the supreme court should
grant the application, the superior court would then be empowered to
hear the petition for the writ of error corain nobis, and to pass upon the
constitutional questions presented. From an adverse judgment on the
petition, an appeal would lie to the supreme court. But in view of the
opinion In re Taylor,8 1 undoubtedly this procedure must be followed
hereafter before the federal courts will entertain a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to review questions arising in North Carolina involving
the denial of due process.
32
EMERY B. DENNY, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Present Insanity-Determination of the
Issue When Raised Before Trial
When the case of State v. Sullivan1 was called for trial, the attorney
for the defendant (charged with breaking and entering with intent to
commit a felony) desired to enter the plea of incapacity to plead to the
bill of indictment and submitted the issue of defendant's mental capacity
as the only issue at that time. The court announced, however, that both
that issue and the issue of guilt or innocence would be submitted to the
jury at the same time. Defendant, through his counsel, objected to this
ruling, excepted, and appealed. The Supreme Court held that the sub-
mission to the same jury of both issues at the same time was a matter
2 8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943); cf. Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779,
108 S. W. 2d 816 (1937) (overruled on another point, Smith v. Buchanan, 291
Ky. 44, 163 S. W. 2d 5 [1942], modified on other points, Day v. Commonwealth,
296 Ky. 483, 177 S. W. 2d 391 [1944]) ; Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N. W.
339 (1935).
29 Roughton v. Brown, 53 N. C. 393 (1861).
20 Taylor v. Alabama, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1947) ; Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S.
411 (1941)."'229 N. C. 297, 49 S. E. 2d 749 (1948).
22 Taylor v. Alabama, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1947) ; Hedgebeth v. North Carolina,
68 Sup. Ct. 1185 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 (1946); Hysler v.
Florida, 315 U. S. 411 (1941).
-229 N. C. 251, 49 S. E. 2d 458 (1948).
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